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CHATTEL MORTGAGE-VALIDITY OF RECORDED CHATTEL MORTGAGE
AS AGAINST ORDINARY PURCHASER-POSSESSION ENTRUSTED TO MORTGAGORDEALER REGULARLY ENGAGED IN SALE OF SIMILAR ARTICLES-Plaintiffs

purchased from a retail dealer, in the ordinary course of- trade, automobiles
which were subject to properly recorded mortgages given by the dealer to
defendant finance company. The certificates of title which the mortgagordealer had been permitted to retain indicated that the vehicles were free from
lien. Claiming default in payments by the dealer, the defendant seized the
automobiles. Plaintiffs brought actions seeking repossession and damages. As
the evidence clearly disclosed, defendant anticipated that the dealer would make
no disclosure of the encumbrance at the time of sale, but rather expected that
the lien would subsequently be discharged with the proceeds of sale. Defendant
contemplated that the chattel mortgage recording act 1 would protect his security
and that loss occurring through default by a dishonest dealer could be recovered
from the purchaser. In addition, the evidence failed to explain satisfactorily
why a part of the $ioo,ooo paid over to the defendant during the two and a
half month period following these sale transactions had not been applied to the
discharge of these particular mortgagees. The trial court, on the theory that
loss should fall on the party making the perpetration of the fraud possible, granted
relief to the plaintiffs. On appeal, held, affirmed. By the course of its previous
transactions with the dealer and its methods of doing business, the defendant
waived its right to enforce the lien against purchasers having no actual notice.
Dass v. Contract PurchaseCorporation, 38 Mich. 348, 28 N.W. (2d).226
(1947).
There is a sharp conflict of authority on the question of the rights of a
purchaser as against the holder of a properly recorded security interest where,
with the tacit assent of such holder, a retail dealer has been enabled to transfer
an apparently unimpeachable title. The rule that recording constitutes constructive notice, when extended to its logical extreme, will afford protection to the
mortgagee. 2 This implication has been avoided, however, on the ground that
as a result of his conduct the mortgagee has waived his interest in the property
or is estopped to claim benefit of the recording statute.' The precise issue had
been expressly reserved in two previous Michigan cases. 4 But the language of
the recording statute which avoids only instruments not properly recorded, 5
1

Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §

13424; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §

26.929.

2 Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, 155 N.E. 665 (19z7);
Finance & Guaranty Co. v. Defiance Motor Truck Co., 145 Md. 95, 125 A. 585
(1924). See also cases collected in 136 A.L.R. 821 (1942).
1 Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 1o2 S.E. 591 (1920);
Fogle v. General Credit, Inc., 71 App. D.C. 338, zz F. (2d) 45 (1941). See
also Cases in 136 A.L.R. 821 (194?).
4National Bond & Investment Co. v. Union Investment Co., 26o Mich. 307,
244 N.W. 483 (1932) and People v. Etzler, 292 Mich. 489, 29o N.W. 879 (1940).
1 "Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of goods
and chattels which shall hereafter be made which shall not be accompanied by an
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common law concepts of priority, and dicta in prior decisions, all gave support
to the instant defendant's claim. The general rule that filing constitutes constructive notice and precludes a bona fide purchase is well established.' Where
a finance company had taken by assignment a conditional sales contract covering
an automobile upon which there was an outstanding recorded chattel mortgage,
the court held that the assignee took subject to the equity of the mortgage." An
insurance company was permitted to avoid liability on a policy of automobile
theft insurance on the ground of a breach of warranty in that the owner failed
to disclose an outstanding lien.' The owner was a dealer in used cars and the
vehicle had been purchased from another dealer who discharged the encumbrance three months after the sale. The court pointed out, however, that had
the policy not provided for forfeiture "the insurer upon paying the loss, if the
car was recovered, would not be entitled to it by subrogation or assignment
except subject to the lien of the holder of the duly recorded mortgage." ' These
cases are distinguishable from the instant one in that they did not involve as
assignees or purchasers members of the general buying public.1" And tenuous
though this distinction may at first appear, the position of retail purchasers is
inherently different from that of dealers and finance companies. The latter are
cognizant of the practices of the trade. They may take appropriate action to
protect themselves. But, the very name "floor plan mortgage" denotes an
arrangement whereby a charge may be imposed on goods to be placed in the
dealer's regular stock for the purpose of retail sale. Obviously, this method-of
financing can operate effectively only if the purchaser, trusting in the dealer's
apparent ownership, fails to search the record. To penalize the ordinary purchaser for this expected omission seems grossly inequitable and it can only be
hoped that the rationale of this case will not be limited to its particular and
rather shocking facts. The ordinary citizen, when buying at retail, should be
afforded the law's protection. Loss through the defalcations of a dealer should
be regarded as a business risk, legitimately borne by the loan agency. As the
Pennsylvania court has said, "the complicated dealings between many of those
immediate delivery and followed by an actual and continued change of possession of
the things mortgaged, shall be absolutely void . . . as against subsequent purchasers
• . . unless the mortgage or a true copy thereof shall be filed . . . . " Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) § 13424, Mich. Stat. Ann. (937) § 26.929.
6 Saginaw Financing Corp. v. Detroit Lubricator Co., 256 Mich. 441, 74o N.W.
44 (1932); Pinconning State Bank v. Henry, 258 Mich. 44, 241 N.W. 9i3 (1932).
244

7 National Bond & Investment Co. v. Union Investment Co.,
N.W. 483 (1932).

260

Mich. 307,

8 Stamler v. Universal Insurance Co., 305 Mich. 131, 9 N.W. (2d) 33 (1943)9 Stamler v. Universal Insurance Co., 305 Mich. 131 at 136, 9 N.W. (2d) 33
(1943).

-

10 A similar distinction has been adopted by the Ohio courts. In National Guarantee and Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co., 124 Ohio St. 34, 176 N.E. 678
(193), the court, while indicating approval of the estoppel doctrine as applied to
ordinary purchasers, limited its application by denying protection to another and
subsequent mortgagee. And in Colonial Finance Co. v. McCrate, 6o Ohio App. 68,
19 N.E. (2d) 527 (1938), a recorded mortgage was enforced as against an automobile
dealer who had purchased from another dealer at wholesale. See Boehm, "The 'Floor
Plan Rule' in Ohio," 5 OHIO ST. Umv. L. J. 422 (1939).
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trafficking in and loaning money on automobiles has reached a point where the
courts must strip transactions of their pretenses . . . . Those who buy and sell,
bail and loan money on motor vehicles must be given to understand that the
realities of their transactions will be sought for by the courts." "
Edsvin F. Uhl, S.Ed.

I" Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. St. 55 at 57, 123 A. 65o (1924.).

